Liquidity in frictional asset markets by Guillaume Rocheteau & Pierre-Olivier Weill
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
11  05
Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets
Guillaume Rocheteau and Pierre-Olivier WeillWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the 
formal editorial review accorded ofﬁ  cial Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views stated 
herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Working papers are available on the Cleveland Fed’s website at: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research.Working Paper 11-05 January 2011
Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets
Guillaume Rocheteau and Pierre-Olivier Weill
On November 14–15, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland hosted a 
conference on “Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets.” In this paper we review 
the literature on asset markets with trading frictions in both ﬁ  nance and mon-
etary theory using a simple search-theoretic model, and we discuss the papers 
presented at the conference in the context of this literature. We will show the 
diversity of topics covered in this literature, e.g., the dynamics of housing and 
credit markets, the functioning of payment systems, optimal monetary policy and 
the cost of inﬂ  ation, the role of banks, and the effect of informational frictions on 
asset trading.
Guillaume Rocheteau is a professor of economics at the University of California, 
Irvine, and a research associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. He can 
be reached at grochete@uci.edu. Pierre-Olivier Weill is at the University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles, and NBER. He can be reached at poweill@econ.ucla.edu. 
The authors thank Joe Haubrich, Yiting Li, and Randall Wright for comments.￿Liquidity is the object of bilateral search. In a bilateral search, buyers search for sellers, and
sellers search for buyers. When a buyer ￿nds a seller who will trade at mutually acceptable terms,
the buyer has found liquidity. Likewise, when a seller ￿nds a buyer who will trade at mutually
acceptable terms, the seller has found liquidity."
Larry Harris, Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners, 2003.
On November 14-15, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland hosted a conference on ￿Liquidity
in frictional asset markets." The objective of this conference was to highlight a line of research which has
analyzed trading frictions in asset markets using search-and-matching models, thereby providing an explicit
and rigorous meaning to di⁄erent notions of liquidity.
Traditionally, asset market modeling has been the realm of the competitive frictionless paradigm, where
the matching of buyers to sellers is regarded as an instantaneous and costless process. A new body of research,
pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) in monetary theory and Du¢ e, G￿rleanu, and Pedersen
(2005, 2007) in ￿nance, adopts the view that trading frictions and the mechanics of trade are important for
understanding the functioning of asset markets. These trading frictions are obvious in the housing market
(e.g., Caplin and Leahy, 2010, this issue): It takes weeks or months to buy or sell a house. Search frictions
are also relevant in secondary markets for physical goods (Gavazza, 2010), and in the markets for ￿nancial
securities, e.g., ￿xed-income securities, which are typically traded in a decentralized manner in over-the-
counter (OTC) markets (Harris and Piwowar, 2006; Edwards, Harris and Piwowar, 2007). Similarly, credit
relationships are often formed in markets where borrowers and lenders search for each other and negotiate
contracts bilaterally. Examples are the market for overnight loans of federal funds (Ashcraft and Du¢ e, 2007;
Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie, 2010, this issue) and markets for credit derivative instruments. Finally,
a commonly held view is that during ￿nancial disruptions, even very liquid asset markets resemble search
markets, as investors face signi￿cant delays in obtaining acceptable quotes and trading.
Search-and-matching models provide new insights for the di⁄erent dimensions of liquidity. They deliver
a role for trading volume ￿ which does not arise in pure pricing models ￿ they o⁄er an explicit notion
of trading delays, and they generate bid-ask spreads even in the absence of informational asymmetries or
dealers￿inventories. The search-theoretic approach emphasizes how the structure of the market ￿ such as
how agents meet and are matched and what the pricing mechanism is ￿ matter for liquidity and e¢ ciency.
The search-and-matching model can be used to discuss the advantages of OTC versus exchange trading,
1and to understand frictions that are at the center of the policy debate. It can also be used for a normative
analysis of the provision of liquidity by market participants, ￿nancial intermediaries, and policymakers.
An explicit description of the frictions that plague some markets is also crucial to explain the role that
assets play to facilitate exchange by serving as means of payment or collateral. A case in point is ￿at money,
an intrisically useless object, that has a positive value because of its role as a medium of exchange. The
same approach that is used in monetary theory to explain the liquidity value of ￿at money can be applied
to other assets, and it can help us to understand the liquidity structure of asset yields, how monetary policy
a⁄ect asset prices, and the optimal provision of liquidity.
1 A simple framework
In order to present an overview of this literature, and the papers contained in this volume, we construct a
simple framework to analyze frictions in asset markets. The model speci￿cation is a variation of Vayanos
and Wang (2007), which itself builds upon Diamond (1982) and the follow-up literature.1 We consider a
continuous-time economy with a ￿xed supply, S, of trees that yield a constant ￿ ow of fruits, d. At each point
in time, there is a constant ￿ ow, F, of potential buyers entering the economy. Buyers would like to hold one
tree in order to consume its fruits. For tractability, trees are indivisible and agents cannot hold more than
one tree. After a period of time of random length, exponentially distributed with mean 1=￿, an agent no
longer wants to hold a tree: If she holds one, she incurs a ￿ ow cost, ￿. One common interpretation of this
feature is that the agent receives a liquidity shock that makes her want to sell her asset. We will be more
explicit about this liquidity shock in Section 5 when we formalize the role of assets as means of payment.
Alternatively, one could think of a change in agents￿hedging needs requiring some portfolio rebalancing, as
in Du¢ e, G￿rleanu, and Pedersen (2007) and Vayanos and Weill (2008). What matters for our purpose is
that this shock generates a ￿ ow of agents who want to sell their assets. Once the asset has been sold, the
agent leaves the economy permanently.2 Trading frictions arise because ￿nding a trading partner takes time.
With some Poisson arrival rate, ￿b, buyers ￿nd a seller and acquire the asset. Similarly, sellers ￿nd buyers
1The methodology to formalize markets with bilateral matching and bargaining is reviewed in Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990). Our model is related to the monetary models of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), Shi (1995), and Trejos and Wright
(1995), the labor market model of Pissarides (2000), the housing model of Wheaton (1990), and the models of asset markets of
Vayanos and Weill (2008), Afonso (2008), and Kim (2008, 2009).
2Instead of having agents exiting permanently, we could assume that agents who exit the market can become buyers again
in the future. For such a formulation see, e.g., Du¢ e, G￿rleanu, and Pedersen (2005).
2with Poisson arrival rate, ￿s. We will assume that agents are risk-neutral and discount future utility at rate



















The ￿rst building block of the model is the description of the process through which buyers and sellers are
brought together. In Harris￿ s (2003, p.398) words:
￿We can characterize the expected outcome of a search problem as a production function that
explains how the inputs to the search are related to the expected products of the search.￿
This approach is similar to the one used by Pissarides (2000) to formalize search-matching activities in
the labor market.
2.1 The matching function
Consider a market composed of ￿b buyers and ￿s sellers. Taking the search e⁄orts of buyers and sellers as
given, the inputs to the search problem are the numbers of buyers and sellers. The output is the number
of matches that are formed. There are multiple reasons for why the matching process is not instantaneous.
Buyers and sellers might be heterogenous in terms of their portfolio needs; it takes time for an agent to
locate someone on the other side of the market; buyers and sellers might be asymmetrically informed about
3the characteristics of the asset that is traded; the arrivals of buyers and sellers in a marketplace are not
synchronized; there are technological constraints that prevent all orders from being matched instantly.
It is common to summarize these trading frictions using a reduced-form matching function, ￿M(￿b;￿s),
which speci￿es the number of trading opportunities per unit of time. The parameter ￿ is a scaling variable,
which determines the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The matching function is continuous and increasing
with respect to each of its arguments, and equal to 0 when one side of the market has no agent, i.e., when
￿b = 0 or ￿s = 0. In labor-market applications, empirical evidence has convinced many researchers that
M(￿b;￿s) has constant returns to scale (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). For housing and ￿nancial
markets, however, as of now there is no compelling empirical evidence that the constant-returns assumption
should (or should not) apply.3
In some markets, observable trading mechanics are naturally represented by more speci￿c matching tech-
nologies.4 For instance, in the housing market, search frictions are well described by a stock-￿ ow matching
process (Taylor, 1995; Coles and Smith, 1998; Ebrahimy and Shimer, 2006). In the context of the housing
market, a stock-￿ ow matching process assumes that a new buyer ￿rst inspects all the houses that are on
sale. If he ￿nds a house he likes, he is instantly matched. Otherwise, he has to enter the stock of unmatched
buyers and wait until new vacant houses are put on the market. A similar matching process arises in limit
order books (Rosu, 2009; Biais, Hombert, and Weill, 2010). For instance, a new limit order to buy can be
immediately executed if its limit price is high enough to be matched with a limit-sell order stocked in the
book. Otherwise, the new limit order is stocked in the book until some other trader places a low enough
limit-sell order.
Trading frictions can also be explained by informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers regarding
the quality of assets.5 There can be assets of di⁄erent qualities, and the holder of the asset might be better
informed about the characteristics of his assets (e.g., its future cash ￿ ows). For instance, according to Plantin
(2009), securitized pools of loans are sold to institutional investors who receive a ￿ ow of future privileged
information about their cash ￿ ows. Hopenhayn and Werner (1996) and Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright
3To the contrary, Weill (2008) shows that, in ￿nancial markets, the sign of the cross￿ sectional relationship between various
liquidity proxies and asset tradeable shares is consistent with increasing returns in matching, and inconsistent with constant or
decreasing returns.
4For a survey of the microfoundations of the matching function in the context of the labor market, see Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001).
5Similarly, a large part of the market microstructure literature resorts to asymmetries of information to endogenize transaction
costs in ￿nancial markets. See, e.g., Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
4(2010, this issue) introduce private information problems about the quality of assets into search models and
show that there are circumstances under which a buyer will refuse to trade with a seller who holds an asset
of unknown quality.6 In Rocheteau (2008) and Li and Rocheteau (2009) private information problems a⁄ect
the sizes of the trades.
Matching frictions are also generated by the heterogeneity of buyers and sellers. Agents might value the
asset di⁄erently depending on their liquidity and hedging needs, or they can have di⁄erent rates of time
preference or di⁄erent costs of participating in the market. While in our simple model we do not take this
heterogeneity explicitly into account, it is certainly an important aspect of the search-and-matching frictions
that characterize some asset markets and a key determinant of the supply and demand for liquidity. Such
two-sided heterogeneity has been shown to matter for the extent to which the market is segmented (e.g.,
Burdett and Coles, 1997; Shimer and Smith, 2000; Jacquet and Tan, 2007).
Finally, trading frictions can result from technological constraints on the ability of intermediaries to
process large volume of orders. For instance, electronic trading platforms have capacity constraints that can
generate bottlenecks and trading delays. Weill (2009) formalizes this view in a competitive ￿nancial market,
where marketmakers face a capacity constraint on their number of trades per unit of time with outside
investors.7
2.2 Time in the market
Let us go back to our model with the reduced-form matching function, M(￿b;￿s). It can be used to construct
the expected times that buyers and sellers spend in the market. Time is taken to be continuous, and the









Assuming for simplicity that the matching function has constant returns to scale, the matching rates depend
only on the ratio of buyers to sellers ￿ = ￿b=￿s: ￿s = ￿M(￿;1) ￿ ￿￿(￿) and ￿b = ￿M(1;1=￿) = ￿M(￿;1)=￿ =
￿￿(￿)=￿. Note that the assumption that M(0;￿s) = M(￿b;0) = 0 implies that ￿(0) = 0 and ￿(￿)=￿ ! 0
6Williamson and Wright (1994) were the ￿rst to introduce a private information problem in a monetary search model. See
Section 5.
7See also Sattinger (2002) and Stevens (2007) for an application of queueing theory to describe search frictions.
5as ￿ ! 1. Likewise, the assumption that M(￿b;￿s) is increasing in both arguments means that ￿(￿) is
increasing, while ￿(￿)=￿ is decreasing.8 If the matching technology exhibits increasing returns to scale then
the matching rates depend not only on the composition of the market but also on its size.
The measures of buyers and sellers are endogenous. Let ￿o denote the measure of asset owners who are
not seeking to sell their asset. The ￿ ows in and out of the buyer, owner, and seller states obey the ordinary
di⁄erential equations:
_ ￿b = F ￿ (￿b + ￿)￿b (1)
_ ￿o = ￿b￿b ￿ ￿￿o (2)
_ ￿s = ￿￿o ￿ ￿s￿o (3)
According to the right side of (1), the measure of buyers increases with the ￿ ow of new agents entering the
market, F, and decreases with the ￿ ow of buyers who are matched with sellers, ￿b￿b, and with the ￿ ow
of buyers who receive a preference shock and exit the market, ￿￿b. Equations (2) and (3) have a similar
interpretation. In a steady state, ￿b = F=(￿b + ￿), ￿o = ￿b
￿b+￿
F
￿, and ￿s = ￿b
￿b+￿
F
￿s. In equilibrium, the
measure of agents holding an asset, ￿o + ￿s, must equal the ￿xed stock of the asset, S. If the matching













and it determines a unique ratio of buyers per seller, ￿. It can be checked that ￿ decreases with S and ￿,
and it increases with F. In the case where F
￿ > S, ￿ also increases with ￿. The volume of trades is ￿￿(￿)￿s,
and the turnover of the asset is ￿￿(￿)￿s=S.
It is useful to consider the frictionless limiting economy as the e¢ ciency of the matching process becomes
in￿nite, ￿ ! 1. Consider the case when F
￿ > S: i.e., the total measure of traders who would be happy to
own, F=￿, is greater than the asset supply, S. From (4), one easily veri￿es that as the matching e¢ ciency
goes to in￿nity, ￿ ! 1, the number of buyers per seller goes to in￿nity, ￿ ! 1, and the matching rate
of sellers goes to in￿nity as well, ￿s ! 1. Therefore, in the frictionless limit, sellers can sell their asset
instantly. Buyers, on the other hand, must wait until asset owners receive a preference shock and sell their
8A popular matching function in both the monetary and ￿nance literatures, the so-called Kiyotaki-Wright matching function,
is one where the contact rate of an agent is proportional to the fraction of market participants that are on the other side of the
market. In this case, M(￿b;￿s) =
￿b￿s
￿b+￿s
. Du¢ e and Sun (2007) and Stevens (2007) provide explicit microfoundations for this
matching function.




￿b = ￿S. Note that in the frictionless limit F=￿ ￿ S
is the measure of buyers, i.e., the measure, F=￿, of agents who would be happy to own an asset, minus the
measure, S, of agents who actually own one. Thus, buyers￿search times adjusts so that the ￿ ow of buyers
who buy the asset is exactly equal to the ￿ ow of assets, ￿S, put on the market by owners who receive a
preference shock.
3 Asset prices
The second building block of the model is the collection of values (lifetime maximum expected utility) of
buyers, owners, and sellers at a steady state. These solve the following Hamilton￿ Jacobi￿ Bellman equations:
rVb = ￿b (￿p + Vo ￿ Vb) ￿ ￿Vb (5)
rVo = d + ￿(Vs ￿ Vo) (6)
rVs = d ￿ ￿ + ￿s (p ￿ Vs) (7)
According to the right side of (5), a buyer ￿nds a seller with Poisson arrival rate ￿b, in which case she pays
the price p to purchase the asset and makes a transition to the owner state. On the other hand, with Poisson
arrival rate, ￿, the buyer no longer wants to hold the asset and leaves the market. The other Bellman
equations have similar interpretations.
From (5), the buyer￿ s surplus from a trade is ￿p + Vo ￿ Vb, while from (7), the seller￿ s surplus is p ￿ Vs.
So the total match surplus is ￿ ￿ Vo ￿ Vb ￿ Vs. It is the value of an owner minus the values of a buyer and
a seller. Substracting (5) and (7) from (6) and rearranging, we ￿nd that the total surplus of a match is
￿ =
￿
r + ￿ + ￿b￿ + ￿s(1 ￿ ￿)
; (8)
where ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ are the respective fractions of the match surplus appropriated by the buyer and the
seller, usually interpreted as their respective bargaining powers.9 From (8) the match surplus is proportional
to the holding cost, ￿. More precisely, it can be interpreted as the present value of the holding cost that
would be incurred by the seller in case trade does not occur until either: the buyer loses her desire to
9Because of the bilateral monopoly problem between the buyer and the seller, there are many ways one could split the match
surplus. In over-the-counter markets, prices are usually determined through a bargaining process between the buyer and the
seller. (See, e.g., Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Du¢ e, G￿rleanu, and Pedersen, 2005.) A solution to this bargaining
problem is provided by the Nash solution, where ￿ is the exogenous bargaining power of the buyer. Explicit alternating-o⁄er
bargaining games predict similar outcomes. See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
7trade with intensity ￿, in which case the potential match surplus vanishes; the buyer (seller) ￿nds another
counterparty with intensity ￿b (￿s) and recoups a fraction ￿ (1￿￿) of the surplus. In this model the surplus
is strictly positive because trading takes time. If either the buyer or the seller could trade without delays
and ￿b￿ + ￿s(1 ￿ ￿) = 1, then the match surplus would shrink to zero.
A convenient expression for the asset price is found by subtracting (5) and the identity rp = rp from (6):
r(Vo ￿ Vb ￿ p) = d ￿ rp ￿ ￿(Vo ￿ Vb ￿ Vs) ￿ ￿b (Vo ￿ Vb ￿ p);
which implies
rp = d ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (r + ￿b)￿￿: (9)
The ￿rst term is standard: It is the ￿ ow dividend payment, which is capitalized in the asset price. The
second and the third terms arise because of search-and-matching frictions. The second term is a liquidity
discount because, with intensity ￿, a buyer who receives a preference shock no longer wants to hold the asset
and, as a consequence, the match surplus, ￿, is lost. The third term is a bargaining discount, because the
buyer is able to extract a fraction, ￿, of the surplus from the seller. So this simple model delivers a rich
theory of asset prices that depend on the structure of the market, which includes the matching technology
and agents￿bargaining powers. In the context of the housing market Caplin and Leahy (2010, this issue)
show that such a model of trade with matching frictions can generate the large price changes and the positive
correlation between prices and sales that we see in the data.
Let us consider the limit of the asset price when trading frictions vanish.10 As before, suppose that
F
￿ > S; i.e., the market is a seller￿ s market. Then, ￿s ! 1, and ￿b stays bounded. From (8), as long as
￿ < 1, ￿ ! 0. From (9), p ! 1=r, the discounted sum of dividends.
Our model can be used to analyze traditional measures of transaction costs, such as bid-ask spreads.
For this, consider the payo⁄-equivalent economy in which the buyer￿ s bargaining power is a random variable
with support [0;1] and mean ￿, independently distributed across encounters. Then, the maximum buying
price (the ask) is pa = Vo ￿ Vb and the minimum selling price (the bid) is pb = Vs. The bid-ask spread is
then equal to the total match surplus:
pa ￿ pb = ￿ =
￿
r + ￿ + ￿b￿ + ￿s(1 ￿ ￿)
:
10For related limiting results, see Du¢ e, G￿rleanu, and Pedersen (2005) and Miao (2005). Earlier results were derived in
di⁄erent contexts by Gale (1987) and Spulber (1996).
8The bid-ask spread is proportional to the seller￿ s cost of holding the asset, ￿. But if the matching process
becomes in￿nitely e¢ cient and ￿b￿ + ￿s(1 ￿ ￿) = 1, then the bid-ask spread vanishes.
Because it assumes that only one asset is traded, the above model analyzes the impact of liquidity on
asset prices only by comparative statics, and thus cannot explain why assets may di⁄er in their liquidity in
the ￿rst place. Vayanos and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), and Weill (2008) provide multi-asset
models starting from the assumption that all asset markets share the same matching technology. Liquidity
and price di⁄erences arise endogenously in equilibrium as a consequence of investors￿optimal search behavior,
and can be related to asset fundamental characteristics. We will revisit this theme in Section 5 when we
endogeneize the role that assets play to facilitate exchange.
So far, the price of the asset is determined by investors themselves. In many markets, prices are set by
some intermediaries (e.g., brokers or dealers). Such intermediaries can be described, as in Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1987), Spulber (2006), Du¢ e, G￿rleanu, and Pedersen (2005), or Weill (2007), as agents with a
higher meeting rate. For instance, in Du¢ e, G￿rleanu, and Pedersen (2005) dealers can contact each other
instantly in a competitive interdealer market. Alternatively, middlemen might have a better technology to
recognize the quality of assets, as in Li (1998). The model can then provide a natural de￿nition of the bid-ask
spread as the di⁄erence between the price at which intermediaries sell the asset and the price at which they
buy it.
We have assumed that the asset price was determined through a negotiation. Alternatively, prices can
be posted by some market makers. If investors di⁄er in terms of their information about the prices in
the market￿ some investors are sophisticated while others are unsophisticated￿ then, following the logic in
Burdett and Judd (1983), the model is able to predict a distribution of posted prices. This is consistent with
the ￿nding of Green, Holli￿eld, and Schurho⁄ (2007) for the market of municipal bonds.
For simplicity, we have restricted agents￿asset holdings to f0;1g. This assumption is made for tractability
and is common in the literature, dating back to Diamond (1982) and more recently Du¢ e, G￿rleanu, and
Pedersen (2005). The model has been extended in G￿rleanu (2007) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2007, 2009) to
allow for unrestricted asset holdings. They show that if agents can adjust their asset holdings in a continuous
fashion, then trading frictions have signi￿cant impact on the distribution of asset holdings, trade volume,
and trading costs, but not necessarily on asset prices.
94 Market participation
Since every buyer enters the market seeking to purchase one share of the asset, the ￿ ow of buyers, F, is
naturally interpreted as the amount of capital ￿ owing in the market, what Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
refer as ￿funding liquidity￿ . This is a crucial parameter of our model because it ultimately determines the
ease of transacting in the market, represented by search times, what Brunnermeier and Pedersen refer as
"market liquidity." In what follows, by endogenizing F, we provide a simple model of the two-way interaction
between "funding liquidity" and "market liquidity," and analyze its welfare implications. Related models are
studied by Huang and Wang (2009, 2010), and our current formalization is similar to the one in Pissarides
(2000, ch.7) in the context of the labor market, and Vayanos and Wang (2007) and Afonso (2008) in the
context of asset markets.
Suppose that agents di⁄er in terms of their participation costs in the market. These costs represent the
opportunity costs of giving up investment opportunities in other markets. Let F(c) denote the ￿ ow of agents
with an entry cost less than c and assume, to simplify the analysis, that the entry cost is paid once and for
all upon entry. An agent is willing to enter the market if her entry cost is smaller than some threshold cR.













which gives an increasing relationship between the ratio of buyers to sellers, ￿, and the threshold for the entry
cost below which agents enter, cR. Intuitively, if cR increases, then there is larger ￿ ow of buyers entering
the market, which must be balanced by a larger out￿ ow of sellers in a steady state; i.e., ￿ increases.
Buyers at the threshold entry cost must be indi⁄erent between entering or not; i.e., Vb = cR. From (5)
and (8), this indi⁄erence condition can be written as




r + ￿ + ￿
￿(￿)
￿ ￿ + ￿￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
: (11)
This de￿nes a decreasing relationship between cR and ￿. Intuitively, if the ratio ￿ of buyers to sellers
increases, then buyers have a harder time ￿nding sellers and so they are willing to incur smaller entry costs.
The two relationships (10) and (11), labelled "steady state" and "entry," respectively, in Figure 2, uniquely
de￿ne the equilibrium values of cR and ￿.
This simple model can be used to study how changes in fundamentals a⁄ect participation decisions.








Figure 2: Equilibrium with endogenous participation
Figure 2 shifts upward. More buyers enter the market (cR increases) in order to respond to sellers￿higher
demand for liquidity. As a result ￿ increases, i.e. sellers can trade faster on average.
So far, we have only considered a participation decision on the buyer￿ s side. We could make the buyer￿ s
decision to sell her assets endogenous as well. One could assume, for instance, that the cost of holding the
asset, ￿, follows a stochastic process. When this cost is su¢ ciently high, sellers would choose to participate
in order to sell their assets.
A natural question is whether agents￿participation decisions (and hence "funding" liquidity) are socially
e¢ cient. By participating in the market, a buyer reduces the search times of potential sellers; this is a
thick market externality. But the new entrant reduces the search times of other buyers; this is a congestion
externality (Afonso, 2008). As it has been well-known since Hosios (1990), in environments where prices are
set through bargaining, these externalities in general do not cancel out and participation is socially ine¢ cient.
To see this point, suppose that the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale (a necessary condition
for social e¢ ciency). By Euler Homegenous Function Theorem, M = M￿b￿b + M￿s￿s, where M￿b and M￿s
denote the partial derivative of the matching function with respect to ￿b and ￿s, respectively. According to






of the matches. Since the buyer￿ s share in the match surplus is ￿, the social and private gains from buyers￿
participation coincide if ￿ = ￿0(￿)￿=￿(￿); i.e., the buyer￿ s surplus share must re￿ ect her contribution to the
matching process.11 If this condition is not satis￿ed, then participation is socially ine¢ cient, and Pigouvian
taxes or subsidies are welfare improving.
Alternatively, these externalities can be internalized by requiring that prices be set in advance and be
made publicly available. This notion of equilibrium, ￿rst formalized by Moen (1997), is called competitive
search equilibrium.12 Suppose, for instance, that sellers can post the price at which they commit to sell their
asset. Buyers can observe all the posted prices and direct their search toward the price of their choosing.
We can then de￿ne a submarket as a subset of sellers posting a price and a subset of buyers looking for
that price. On each submarket there are search frictions as described earlier. When setting their prices
sellers take into account that the buyer-to-sellers ratio in the submarket, ￿(p), will adjust so that buyers are
indi⁄erent between searching in that submarket and searching in a di⁄erent one. The seller￿ s problem can
then be written as:
rVs = d ￿ ￿ + max
p;￿




(￿p + Vo ￿ Vb) = (r + ￿)Vb; (13)
where the seller takes as given the buyer￿ s values Vb and Vo of searching in other submarkets and of becoming
an owner. Equation (13), which gives a decreasing relationship between ￿ and p, captures the key trade-o⁄
faced by the seller: If she increases her price, p, then ￿ decreases; i.e., her market is less attractive to buyers,
and she has to accept longer search times.
One can use (13) to obtain an expression for ￿(￿)p as a function of ￿. Plugging this expression into
the seller￿ s objective, (12), to eliminate p, and taking derivatives with respect to ￿ leads to the ￿rst-order
condition:
(r + ￿)Vb = ￿￿0(￿)(V0 ￿ Vb ￿ Vs);
11This line of reasoning was developed in Mortensen (1982).
12See also Mortensen and Wright (2002) for a presentation of this equilibrium concept and some extensions.
12or, equivalently,







(V0 ￿ Vb ￿ Vs):
The price is the one that would prevail in an economy with ex-post bargaining, where the buyer￿ s bargaining
power corresponds to the contribution that a marginal buyer makes to the matching process, as measured
by ￿0(￿)￿=￿(￿). As argued above, in this case, participation decisions are socially e¢ cient.
The competitive search equilibrium is also convenient for discussing how investors￿heterogeneity a⁄ects
participation. Suppose, for instance, that there are two types of buyers with di⁄erent participation costs.
The market will then be endogenously segmented, with one submarket for buyers with a low participation
cost and a di⁄erent submarket for buyers with a high participation cost. In the submarket where buyers
have a high participation cost, the price will be high but ￿ will be low to reduce buyers￿search times.
Another approach to endogenize the ease of trading is to explicitly model ￿nancial intermediation. For
instance, dealers could choose the intensity with which they match buyers and sellers (Du¢ e, G￿rleanu,
and Pedersen, 2005), whether or not to participate in the market at some cost (Lagos and Rocheteau, 2007,
2009), or the size of their asset inventories (Shevshenko, 2004; Weill, 2007; Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill,
2008). The model can then be used to investigate time-varying liquidity, i.e., how the ease of trading can
vary over time as a function of market conditions.
5 Liquidity and payments
So far we have captured a motive for trading the asset by introducing idiosyncratic shocks that a⁄ect agents￿
utility ￿ ow from holding the asset. In the following we will be more explicit and we will assume the asset
can be used to ￿nance random spending opportunities, as in the monetary models of Shi (1995), Trejos and
Wright (1995), and Wallace (1996, 2000). In contrast with the previous section, this model gives rise to a
liquidity premium (instead of a liquidity discount), which capitalizes the transaction services provided by
the asset in the presence of search frictions.
Consider the same environment as before with two consumption goods: the fruits produced by the asset,
and a consumption good traded in a bilateral match between a consumer and a producer, call it a search
good. There is ￿ ow F of agents who enter the economy with a single opportunity to produce search goods.
They will search for a consumer and trade their output for an asset that they can spend later in their lives
when it is their turn to consume. The search good is perfectly divisible and perishable, and consumption and
13production take place on the spot. After having produced, an agent has the desire to consume after a period
of random length exponentially distributed with mean 1=￿. In order to produce q 2 R+ units of the search
good, the producer incurs a disutility cost q. The consumption of q units generates u(q) in terms of utility,
where u(￿) has the usual properties. After having consumed, the agent leaves the economy permanently. We
assume that agents cannot commit and that there is no record-keeping of individual trades. As shown by
Kocherlakota (1998), in such an economy there is an essential role for an asset as a medium of exchange.
The distribution of agents across states (￿b, ￿o, ￿s) and the matching rates are determined as before.
Let us turn to the determination of the output traded in bilateral meetings, q. The ￿ ow Bellman equations
are
rVb = ￿b (￿q + Vo ￿ Vb) (14)
rVo = d + ￿(Vs ￿ Vo) (15)
rVs = d + ￿s [u(q) ￿ Vs]: (16)
According to (14) a buyer of the asset, who is also a producer of the search good, meets a seller at rate ￿b.
The buyer produces q units of the consumption good in exchange for the asset. According to (15), an agent
with no production opportunity and no desire to consume the search good enjoys only the consumption of
the fruits generated by his asset. With Poisson arrival rate ￿, he receives a preference shock and wishes to
consume the search good. According to (16) the seller of the asset enjoys the dividend ￿ ow, d, and meets a
buyer at rate ￿s. He receives q units of the consumption good, valued according to the utility function u(q),
in exchange for his asset, and he leaves the market permanently.
How is q determined? As before, we will assume that the output a unit of asset buys is determined
through bargaining. Suppose ￿rst that the buyer of the asset has all the bargaining power. The seller of
the asset is indi⁄erent between selling or not selling so that u(q) = Vs and Vs = Vo = d=r. The value from
holding the asset corresponds to its fundamental value. In particular, if the dividend goes to 0, then the
value of the asset is 0. The asset has no purchasing power, q = 0, and agents obtain no more than their
autarky payo⁄, Vb = Vo = Vs = 0.
Suppose next that the seller of the asset has all the bargaining power. Then, the buyer of the asset is
indi⁄erent between buying or not buying so that q = Vo and Vb = 0. From (15) and (16) the purchasing
14power of the asset is determined by
(r + ￿)q =
￿







The solution to (17) is represented in Figure 3 where ￿RHS￿corresponds to the right side of (17) and ￿LHS￿
corresponds to the left side. If agents receive no spending shock, ￿ = 0, then the asset is priced at its
fundamental value, q = d=r. In contrast, if the asset is useful as a means of payment, then its price rises
above the fundamental value q = d=r. Because of its moneyness, the asset acquires a "liquidity premium" or
a "convenience yield" (Cochrane, 2005). To see this, consider the limit case when d tends to 0 and the real
asset approaches a ￿at money. Although the asset pays no dividend, it still has a positive value in exchange
when ￿ > 0, i.e., to the extent it helps ￿nance agents￿needs to consume the search good. Graphically, the
right side of (17) is represented by the dashed curve in Figure 3. There are two equilibria: a monetary one
with q > 0 and a nonmonetary one at the origin. One can use this simple model to study the e⁄ects of a
change in the money stock on the value of money. As the stock of money increases, the number of sellers





Figure 3: Value of the asset when used as a means of payment
Because of the unit upper bound on asset holdings and the indivisibility of assets, the model is limited
15in its ability to discuss monetary policy. Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005) have extended the model
(in the case where the asset is a ￿at money, d = 0) to allow for divisible money and unrestricted asset
holdings.13 The model can then be used to study conventional monetary policy, such as the optimal rate of
growth of the money supply. For instance, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) investigate the optimality of the
Friedman rule ￿ one version of which requires the money supply to contract at the rate of time preference ￿
under di⁄erent trading mechanisms and with and without search externalities, and show that it is sometimes
optimal to increase in￿ ation above the Friedman rule to mitigate the congestion externalities in the goods
market. Several papers in this issue adopt a similar framework to discuss monetary policy. Berentsen and
Waller (2010, this issue) show that if the monetary authority pursues a price-level target, it can control
in￿ ation expectations and improve welfare by stabilizing short-run shocks to the economy. Jacquet and Tan
(2010, this issue) study a version of the model in which money has a dual role as a self-insurance device and
as a means of payment and show that the optimal monetary policy is such that the in￿ ation rate is state
contingent.
Another central question in monetary economics is the welfare loss for society associated with in￿ ationary
￿nance. Lucas (2000) provides a survey of this literature. Using a reduced-form money demand function
he shows that the welfare cost of 10 percent in￿ ation is about 1 percent of GDP every year. One insight
from the microfounded model of monetary exchange of Lagos and Wright is to show that the welfare cost
of in￿ ation can be much larger than the traditional estimate, by a factor of three, once one spells out
carefully the frictions in the environment that give rise to a positive money demand. In this line of work,
Chiu and Molico (2010, this issue) quantify the welfare costs and the redistributive e⁄ects of in￿ ation in
the presence of idiosyncratic liquidity risk. They show that in￿ ation induces important redistributive e⁄ects
across households.
Recent evidence about the "moneyness" of real assets is provided by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2008) who document a negative relationship between the yield spread between corporate bonds
and Treasury securities and the U.S. government debt-to-GDP ratio, based on annual observations from 1925
to 2005. Their notion of an aggregate demand for Treasury debt is directly borrowed from the traditional no-
tion of aggregate money demand, such as the one used by Lucas (2000) to assess the welfare cost of in￿ ation.
Applying a similar calculation to Treasuries, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen found that ￿the value
13For a survey of this new generation of monetary models, see Williamson and Wright (2010).
16of the liquidity provided by the current level of Treasuries is around 0.95 per cent of GDP per year.￿Just
as microfounded models of monetary exchange o⁄er new estimates for the cost of in￿ ation, microfounded
models of liquidity o⁄er a new avenue to think about the social bene￿ts of the liquidity provided by Treasury
securities.
The simple model we described above has a single asset that can serve as medium of exchange. A
central objective of monetary theory, however, is to explain which asset among multiple assets will serve
as money to facilitate trades. From Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), we learned that fundamental features of
supply and demand, social conventions, and the properties of assets matter for the moneyness of an asset.
The relationship between the physical properties of an asset (cash ￿ ow, divisibility, storage cost) and its
moneyness has been investigated further by Wallace (2000), who develops a theory of the liquidity structure
of asset yields based on indivisibility. Financial economists often relate asset liquidity to the extent of
asymmetric information about cash ￿ ows. Two papers in this issue embed this idea into search models and
investigate the manner in which an asset￿ s ￿recognizability￿a⁄ects its liquidity.14 Lester, Postlewaite, and
Wright (2010) show that assets that exist in di⁄erent qualities and that lack recognizability might not be
acceptable in decentralized trades. Cavalcanti and Nosal (2010, this issue) use a version of the model above
to study the counterfeiting of currency when agents are heterogenous in terms of their ability to produce
counterfeits and show, using a mechanism design approach, that it is not e¢ cient to eliminate counterfeiting
activity completely.
If di⁄erent assets have di⁄erent liquidity properties, they should also have di⁄erent rates of return. To
the extent that monetary theory can help explain liquidity di⁄erences across assets, it can also help explain
seemingly anomalous rate-of-return di⁄erences, such as the rate-of-return-dominance puzzle, or the equity-
premium and risk-free-rate puzzles. The rate-of-return-dominance puzzle is about the observation that
individuals hold money instead of interest-bearing assets. This puzzle has been studied in the context of
search-theoretic models by Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1997) and Zhu and Wallace (2007), among others.
Lagos (2007) uses a version of the model with divisible bonds and equity to address the equity-premium
and risk-free-rate puzzles. Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007) replace bonds with money and
study the e⁄ects of monetary policy on asset prices. An increase in the rate of growth of the money supply
reduces the rate of return of ￿at money, which induces agents to use more stocks for their liquidity needs.
14Williamson and Wright (1994) were the ￿rst to formalize the view that ￿at money provides superior transaction services
because it is more easily recognizable than other means of payments.
17Because stocks are in ￿xed supply, their price must go up. Lagos (2010, this issue) considers the case in
which stocks are risky and shows that the optimal monetary policies implement Friedman￿ s prescription of
zero nominal interest rates. Under an optimal policy, equity prices and returns are independent of monetary
considerations.
Just like intermediaries are useful to make markets, they have a role in providing liquid assets. Banks,
which supply circulating liabilities (inside money) are a case in point. Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) pro-
pose a model similar to the one above in which banks are described as agents whose trading histories are
public, so that they can be induced to redeem their liabilities. Bencivenga and Camera (2010, this issue)
introduce banks in a model with divisible money and capital. Banks o⁄er demand deposit contracts and
hold primary assets to maximize depositors￿utility. If banks￿operating costs are small, banks reallocate
liquidity, eliminating idle balances and improving the allocation.
The search paradigm o⁄ers a natural framework for thinking about the trading frictions prevailing in
credit markets. Diamond (1987, 1990) and Shi (1996) used a model similar to the one presented in this
section to describe how agents trade with IOUs. Chamley and Rochon (2010, this issue) develop a model
of lending where banks and borrowers meet according to a search process. They show that there can be
multiple equilibria that di⁄er according to whether there is rollover of loans or not, and rollover is socially
ine¢ cient. The global dynamics display a continuum of equilibria, some of them with sudden crises in which
the volume of outstanding loans is reduced. Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie (2010, this issue) develop
a model with credit and liquidity frictions in the interbank market consistent with the liquidity hoarding
by banks and the extreme volatility of the fed funds rate that were observed during the 2007-08 ￿nancial
crisis. Banks rationally hold excess reserves intraday and overnight as a precautionary measure to self-insure
against liquidity shocks.
Finally, models of monetary exchange can be amended to analyze large payment systems and issues
related to settlement.15 A case in point is Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2008) who develop a dynamic
general equilibrium model of payments that incorporates private information frictions. In￿nitely lived agents
trade in bilateral matches and are subject to a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. There is no currency,
but there is a payments system that can record individual transactions and assign balances to its participants.
The model is used to determine the optimal settlement frequency and the trade-o⁄ between trade sizes and
15The canonical model of settlement is due to Freeman (1996), who considers an overlapping-generations economy with
heterogenous agents, some trading with debt, others with money.
18settlement frequency. Afonso and Shin (2010, this issue) construct a model of a payment system calibrated to
reproduce features of the US Fedwire system and study its ability to withstand severe payment disruptions.
They show that individually cautious behavior can accumulate into a signi￿cant and detrimental impact on
the overall functioning of the payment system.
6 Conclusion
We provided an overview of the literature on asset markets with trading frictions in both ￿nance and
monetary theory using a simple search-theoretic model. By taking explicitly into account trade mechanics,
search-theoretic models provide a natural platform to investigate various notions of liquidity. From the
matching technology, one can explain trading delays and the volume of trade or, in a monetary context,
the velocity of the asset. Using various pricing mechanisms (e.g., price posting, bargaining) and alternative
assumptions about traders￿information, one can obtain rich predictions for bid and ask prices. The search
approach also has novel predictions for asset prices, which depend not only on the streams of dividends but
also on trading frictions and buyers￿and sellers￿bargaining powers. In monetary environments asset prices
can also exhibit liquidity premia, which can help explain various asset-pricing anomalies. Finally, the model
makes it possible to discuss positive and normative aspects of liquidity provision, including participation in
the market, market-making and intermediation, and monetary policy.
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